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Abstract
I examine the impact of state policy decisions on the early impact of the ACA using data
through the first half of 2014. I focus on the individual health insurance market, which includes
plans purchased through exchanges as well as plans purchased directly from insurers. In this
market, at least 13.2 million people were covered in the second quarter of 2014, representing
an increase of at least 4.2 million beyond pre-ACA state-level trends. I use data on coverage,
premiums, and costs and a model developed by Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski (2013) to
calculate changes in selection and markups, which allow me to estimate the welfare impact
of the ACA on participants in the individual health insurance market in each state. I then
focus on comparisons across groups of states. The estimates from my model imply that market
participants in the five “direct enforcement” states that ceded all enforcement of the ACA to
the federal government are experiencing welfare losses of approximately $245 per participant
on an annualized basis, relative to participants in all other states. They also imply that the
impact of setting up a state exchange depends meaningfully on how well it functions. Market
participants in the six states that had severe exchange glitches are experiencing welfare losses
of approximately $750 per participant on an annualized basis, relative to participants in other
states with their own exchanges. Although the national impact of the ACA is likely to change
over the course of 2014 as coverage, costs, and premiums evolve, I expect that the differential
impacts that we observe across states will persist through the rest of 2014.
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committed to revisit this analysis using updated data in the Fall 2015 issue. I thank Manon Costinot, Aigerim
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Romer, Clifford Winston, Justin Wolfers, and participants at the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity for helpful
comments. Kevin Lucia and Nancy Turnbull provided helpful institutional details. Funding from the National Science
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As part of the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), all states had their first open
enrollment season for coverage through new health insurance exchanges from October 2013 through
March 2014. Using data through the first half of 2014, I take an early look at the impact of the
ACA on the individual health insurance market. This market includes plans purchased through
exchanges as well as plans purchased directly from insurers. Although a small fraction of the
national population has historically been enrolled in the individual health insurance market, it is
an important market to study because it is the market of last resort for the uninsured, and one
focus of the ACA is to expand coverage to the uninsured. In my data, 13.2 million people were
enrolled in the individual health insurance market per month of the second quarter of 2014. Had
state-level trends persisted from before the implementation of the ACA, 4.2 million fewer people
would be enrolled in this market.
I focus on the impact of state policy decisions on the early impact of the ACA. Whether the
impact of the ACA differed across states is of central policy-relevance because states made several
important decisions regarding the implementation of the ACA. A small number of states decided
to cede all enforcement of the ACA to the federal government. The Federal government refers
to these states as “direct enforcement” states. Other states took far more responsibility for the
implementation of the ACA by setting up their own exchanges and deciding which vendors to use.
The Supreme Court gave states authority to decide whether to implement the Medicaid expansion
legislated by the ACA, and just over half of the states have elected to so do thus far. Similarly, the
White House gave states authority to decide whether to allow the renewal of non-ACA-compliant
non-grandfathered plans, and just over half of states have elected to do so.
Furthermore, most pre-ACA regulation of the individual health insurance market was at the
state-level. Some states already had two important regulations that could affect the functioning
of the individual health insurance market: “community rating” regulations that require all health
insurers to charge the same price to all beneficiaries, regardless of observable characteristics, and
“guaranteed issue” regulations that prevent insurers from denying coverage to applicants, regard-
less of their health status. Both of these regulations were enacted nationally with the ACA, with
community rating enacted separately by state. Therefore, in those states that already had those
2
regulations, we can attempt to isolate the impact of other provisions of the ACA, the most promi-
nent of which is the individual mandate. Such an exercise sheds light on what the impact of the
ACA would have been in the absence of the individual mandate, which would have happened if the
Supreme Court had struck down the individual mandate while upholding the other provisions.
Other state policy decisions from before the implementation of the ACA could have lasting
impacts. For example, pre-ACA policy decisions could affect the number of insurers in the individual
health insurance market, which, in turn, could affect enrollment under the ACA. The number of
insurers could also affect markups.
To make comparisons across groups of states, I first examine the impact of the ACA state-
by-state. I examine data on coverage, premiums, and costs. Using those data and a model that
I developed with Martin Hackmann and Jonathan Kolstad (Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski
(2013), hereafter HKK), I estimate how much better or worse off the ACA made participants in
the individual health insurance market in each state. In this model, the ACA can make market
participants better off if it encourages insurers to decrease “markups” – the difference between
the premiums that they charge and the costs that they incur. The ACA can also make market
participants better off if it mitigates “adverse selection,” meaning that it encourages individuals
with lower insured costs to join the pool.
There have been numerous questions in the popular press about whether enough “young and
healthy” individuals have signed up for health insurance coverage. These claims imperfectly ad-
dress whether there was adverse selection by focusing simply on coverage demographics. I assess
the presence of adverse selection more systematically using cost data and a model. The main
assumption necessitated by the data and the model is that plan generosity did not change with
the implementation of the ACA. By focusing on comparisons across states, I require a weaker
assumption regarding changes in plan generosity across states.
The estimates from my model imply that participants in the five “direct enforcement” states
that ceded all enforcement of the ACA to the federal government are worse off by approximately
$245 per participant on an annualized basis, relative to participants in all other states. They
also imply that the impact of setting up a state exchange depends meaningfully on how well it
functions. Market participants in the six states that had severe exchange glitches are worse off by
approximately $750 per participant on an annualized basis, relative to participants in other states
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with their own exchanges. The estimates imply suggestive evidence that participants in states that
allowed renewal of non-grandfathered plans are worse off than participants in other states. They
also provide inconclusive evidence that participants in states with pre-ACA community rating and
guaranteed issue regulations are better off than participants in other states, likely because these
regulations contributed to pre-ACA adverse selection. They provide further inconclusive evidence
regarding the impact of having more insurers in the pre-ACA state market. Although the national
impact of the ACA is likely to change over the course of 2014 as coverage, costs, and premiums
evolve, I expect that the differential impacts that we observe across states will persist through the
rest of 2014.
In the next section, I present the model, and I describe how I estimate the model in Section 3.
I discuss the data in Section 4, I provide summary statistics in Section 5, and I present results in
Section 6. I compare my results to existing empirical evidence on selection and conclude in Sections
7 and 8.
2 Model
I adapt a simple model from HKK, and I use similar notation to facilitate comparison across papers.
In the model, changes in welfare come from changes in selection and from changes in markups. I
first present the model with only changes in selection, following previous work by Einav, Finkelstein,
and Cullen (2010), hereafter EFC. I then present the full model from HKK, which accounts for
changes in markups. EFC and HKK offer micro-foundations that I omit here for brevity.
2.1 Model Without Markups
Assume for now that insurers charge beneficiaries the average cost that they spend to pay medical
claims. Because beneficiaries differ in the cost of insuring them, I model the average cost curve
AC(I) as a function of the number of individuals in a given market who have coverage I.1 If the
market is adversely selected, then the sickest individuals are the first to sign up for health insurance
coverage at any price. When there is an exogenous increase in the number of insured individuals,
1Note that HKK and EFC represent the fraction of individuals in a given market who have health insurance
coverage with I. I make a different modeling choice since it is so difficult to estimate the potential size of the
individual health insurance market, particularly in the first quarter of 2014 (see Abraham et al. [2013]). However, I
retain the same notation to emphasize that the formulas for welfare analysis are the same under this definition of I.
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the new individuals who sign up for coverage will be healthier than the formerly insured, and insurer
per-enrollee costs will decrease. As depicted in Figure 1, a downward-sloping average cost curve
indicates the presence of adverse selection. The main assumption required is that plan generosity
remains constant for any level of coverage. (If plan generosity decreases, then average costs could go
down in the absence of adverse selection.) Assuming constant plan generosity, though the downward
slope of the AC curve is an indicator of the presence of adverse selection (an upward slope would
indicate advantageous selection), the slope alone is not enough to identify the welfare cost.










The welfare cost of adverse selection is determined by the demand curve for insurance as well
as the average cost curve. The demand curve D(I, π) is a function of enrollment in insurance I,
and the penalty that individuals must pay if they do not have health insurance coverage π, which
is zero before the implementation of the ACA. As shown in Figure 1, in the presence of adverse
selection, pre-reform equilibrium coverage I∗,pre occurs at point A, where the average cost curve
intersects the demand curve. Insurers must charge enrollees their average costs either because
enrollee health cannot be observed or because regulations prevent insurers from pricing based on
underlying health. Optimal coverage I∗,opt would occur at the intersection of the demand curve
and the marginal cost curve MC(I).2 Because demand exceeds the marginal cost of coverage, but
2The average cost curve and the marginal cost curve intersect at zero coverage, but zero coverage is not shown
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that coverage is not provided in equilibrium, adverse selection induces a welfare loss equal to the
entire shaded region (including the lighter area and the darker area) in Figure 1.
Now consider the implementation of the ACA. If individuals must now pay a penalty π if they
do not have health insurance coverage, their demand shifts upward by π, and the new equilibrium
coverage I∗,post occurs at point A. Subsidies behave similarly by shifting the demand curve in the
same direction, so we include them in the “penalty” π for expositional simplicity. It is at first
counterintuitive that subsidies and penalties shift demand in the same direction in the individual
health insurance market. However, since the subsidies are only available in the individual health
insurance market, while they decrease demand in other markets, they increase demand in the
individual health insurance market. In the market for employer-sponsored health insurance, the
penalty and the subsidy shift demand in opposite directions, as modeled in Kolstad and Kowalski
[2012].
The lighter shaded region in Figure 1 gives the welfare gain that results from the mitigation of
adverse selection with the ACA. The penalty depicted is not large enough to eliminate the entire
welfare loss from adverse selection. However, if the combination of subsidies and penalties induces
optimal coverage, I∗,opt then the welfare gain from the implementation of the ACA would also
include the darker shaded region.
2.2 Model With Markups
HKK extend the model to allow insurers to charge a markup beyond the average cost of paying
claims. The “markup” is the difference between the premium and the average cost. It is useful to
extend the model to incorporate markups in empirical settings in which is it possible to separately
observe the premiums charged to beneficiaries and the average costs paid by insurers.
Markups can reflect several factors, including insurer market power and the enrollment pre-
dictions of the actuaries that set premiums. Given these factors, we might expect markups to
change from before to after the introduction of the ACA. Markups could go down if transparency
introduced by the new exchanges decreases market power. Conversely, markups could go up if the
actuaries that set premiums attempt to protect their firms from losses that would occur if the new
enrollees incur higher than expected costs. State regulations only allow firms to set premiums once
along the horizontal axis so that other phenomena can be observed more easily.
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per year, well before costs and enrollment from the previous year are realized, so it could take
several years for markups to reach equilibrium after the ACA. In the interim, markups set before
the implementation of the ACA can induce distortions.
















In the model with markups, equilibrium coverage occurs where average cost plus the markup
is equal to demand. In Figure 2, the pre-reform markup is equal to the vertical distance between
the pre-reform premium P ∗,pre at point A and the pre-reform average cost AC∗,pre at point H.
Analogously, the post-reform markup is equal to the vertical distance between the post-reform
premium P ∗,post at point A’ and the post-reform average cost AC∗,post at point H’. In this extended
model, changes in markups and changes in adverse selection affect welfare. As shown in Figure
2, the full welfare gain from the reduction in adverse selection and the reduction in markups is
given by the area in which demand for coverage exceeds the marginal cost of coverage between the
initial coverage level I∗,pre and the post-reform coverage level I∗,pre. Graphically, in Figure 2, the
full welfare gain is the sum of both shaded regions. Algebraically, the full change in welfare from
changes in adverse selection and markups is as follows:3
∆Wfull = (P
∗, pre −AC∗, pre) ∗ (I∗, post − I∗, pre)
3See HKK for proofs of this equation and the subsequent equations.
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((P ∗, post − π) − P ∗, pre) ∗ (I∗, post − I∗, pre). (1)
From this equation, we see that the welfare impact depends on only seven quantities: pre- and
post-reform coverage, premiums, and average costs, as well as the penalty. Stated another way, the
welfare impact depends on the slope of the average cost curve as well as the slope of the demand
curve. The comparison of point H with point H’ identifies the slope of the average cost curve. The
comparison of point A with point A’, minus the penalty, identifies the slope of the demand curve.
To separate the welfare impact of the change in adverse selection from the change in markups,
HKK perform an accounting exercise to isolate the welfare impact that would have resulted from the
change in adverse selection had the pre-reform markup remained unchanged. This selection-induced
change in welfare is as follows:
∆Wsel = (P






I∗,pre + (I∗,markup − I∗,pre)
)





∗,post − π) − P ∗,pre
I∗,post − I∗,pre
∗ (I∗,markup − I∗,pre)2 (2)





Pop, I∗, pre + π
(I∗, post − I∗, pre)
(AC∗, post −AC∗, pre) − ((P ∗, post − π) − P ∗, pre)
))
,
which accounts for the lower bound of zero coverage and the upper bound of full population coverage
Pop. Intuitively, I∗,markup equals I∗, post if the pre-reform markup equals the post-reform markup.
In addition to calculating the welfare impact of the reform, HKK also calculate the optimal tax
penalty π∗ that would induce optimal coverage I∗, opt. Optimal coverage is as follows:




Pop, I∗, pre +
(P ∗, pre −AC∗, pre) ∗ (I∗, post − I∗, pre)
2(AC∗, post −AC∗, pre) − ((P ∗, post − π) − P ∗, pre)
− (AC
∗, post −AC∗, pre) ∗ I∗, pre
2(AC∗, post −AC∗, pre) − ((P ∗, post − π) − P ∗, pre)
))
.
This equation also accounts for the lower bound of zero coverage and the upper bound of full
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coverage. From optimal coverage, it is possible to calculate the optimal tax penalty π∗ as follows:
π∗ = (P ∗, post − P ∗, pre) − (AC∗, post −AC∗, pre)
+
(AC∗, post −AC∗, pre) − ((P ∗, post − π) − P ∗, pre)
(I∗, post − I∗, pre)
∗ (I∗, opt − I∗, pre). (3)
We can see from Equation 3 that the optimal tax penalty increases proportionally as the difference
between optimal coverage and pre-reform coverage increases.
As drawn in Figure 2, the market is adversely selected and the post-reform markup is smaller
than the pre-reform markup, but Equations 1, 2, and 3 are completely general in the sense that
they can also be applied under advantageous selection and increased markups. Figure 3 shows the
model under advantageous selection and increased markups. In this scenario, there is a welfare loss
from advantageous selection prior to reform because the marginal cost of the last enrollee exceeds
her willingness to pay. Therefore, the pre-reform level of coverage I∗, pre exceeds the optimal level of
coverage I∗, opt, implying that the optimal penalty is negative. The positive penalty implemented
with the reform exacerbates the welfare loss from advantageous selection, and the change in welfare
holding markups constant is the sum of both shaded regions. Increased markups mitigate the
welfare loss by discouraging some individuals from signing up for coverage, such that the full welfare
change from the reform is given by the lighter shaded region. Equation 1 yields the resulting welfare
loss.
3 Empirical Implementation of the Model
The natural health insurance market definition is at the state level, so I apply the theoretical
model separately within each state. Most pre-ACA insurance regulation was at the state level, and
the ACA establishes a separate risk pool for the individual health insurance market in each state
(ASPE [2014]).4 I then compare state-level welfare across states with different policies to isolate
the impact of those policies.
4Risk-adjustment will result in transfers across insurers within a state, so within-insurer analysis would not be
relevant to aggregate welfare, motivating our analysis by state.
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3.1 Empirical Implementation By State
As shown above, only seven data moments are needed for identification of the full model, including
all welfare-relevant quantities: coverage before the reform I∗, pre, insurance coverage after the reform
I∗, post, average costs before the reform C∗, pre, average costs after the reform C∗, post, premiums
before the reform P ∗, pre, premiums after the reform P ∗, post, and the size of the penalty π. With
data on these quantities within a state, I could simply plug these data moments into Equations 2,
2, and 3 to obtain the full welfare effect, the net welfare effect, and the optimal penalty.
However, it is likely problematic to do a simple comparison of coverage, premiums, and costs
before an after reform because there are secular and seasonal trends in all of these variables.
Therefore, to isolate the impact of reform from secular and seasonal trends, I estimate the impact
of reform taking into account seasonal and secular trends. Within each state, I estimate the
following equation:
Yt = α




2 (Q1)t + ρ
Y
3 (Q2)t + ρ
Y
4 (Q3)t + ε
Y
t (4)
where Yt denotes the respective outcome measure of coverage, average costs or premiums. I estimate
a separate regression model for each outcome, obtaining a separate set of coefficients for each
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outcome, indexed by the corresponding superscript. I use quarterly data from the first quarter of
2008 to the second quarter of 2014. After is a dummy variable equal to one in 2014. I do not
include data from the fourth quarter of 2013 in the regression because the open enrollment season
had begun but most coverage had not yet begun and the individual mandate had not yet gone into
effect. The coefficient of interest for each outcome is αY , which denotes the impact of the reform,
after taking into account secular and seasonal trends. I account for secular trends with the trend
term t and for seasonal trends with the quarterly dummies Q1, Q2, and Q3. Before estimating the
regressions, I present graphs that demonstrate the appropriateness of seasonal and secular trends.
Because the 2014 levels of coverage, premiums, and costs are of independent interest without
any adjustment for trends, I calculate Y ∗,post by taking the average of each variable over the first
and second quarter of 2014, weighting by average monthly enrollment. I then adjust Y ∗, pre for
seasonal and secular trends as follows:
Y ∗,pre = Y ∗,post − α̂Y , (5)
where α̂Y is the estimated coefficient from Equation 4. With this transformation of the data, the
values of Y ∗,post are informative summary statistics that capture actual coverage, premiums, and
costs in the first half of 2014. The values of Y ∗,pre are hypothetical values that represent what
coverage, premiums, and costs would have been in the first half of 2014 if the ACA had not been
implemented.
With this minimal amount of regression adjustment, I can examine whether the pre-reform
health insurance market was adversely or advantageously selected, and I can examine whether
markups increased or decreased. Assuming that coverage increased, if C∗,post−C∗,pre < 0, then the
market was adversely selected, and it was advantageously selected otherwise. Relatedly, markups
decreased if (P ∗,post − C∗,post) − (P ∗,pre − C∗,pre) < 0, and increased otherwise.
Simply knowing whether the market was adversely or advantageously selected and whether
markups increased or decreased can tell us about the sign of the welfare impact of the reform in
some specific cases, but in other cases, we need to know the magnitude of the penalty to even
know the sign.5 In all cases, we need to know the magnitude of the penalty to estimate the welfare
5For example, assume that demand is downward sloping and that coverage increases following reform. First con-
sider the case that HKK found with respect to Massachusetts reform, as depicted in Figure 2. The pre-reform market
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impact.
To conduct welfare analysis, I choose a baseline value of $1,500 for π, and I examine robustness to
the plausible range of penalties and subsidies based on their statutory values.6 There is substantial
heterogeneity in subsidies and penalties across individuals, so the assumption of a single penalty is
arguably a strong one. With individual-level data, I could potentially extend the model to account
for heterogeneity in the statutory penalties and subsidies. However, as I discuss below, I do not
have individual-level data. Furthermore, given that there is heterogeneity in the penalties and
subsidies for the same individuals over time, I would still need an assumption about whether the
individuals respond to the contemporaneous penalty or to future penalties. Finally, the behavioral
response to the same penalty could differ across individuals based on the perceived penalty and
the cost of navigating the individual health insurance market. It is likely that even individuals
that are technically exempt from the penalty could respond to it, given the nuance involved in
determining who is exempt. Behavioral responses would be difficult to isolate empirically, so I
proceed by examining robustness to the calibrated penalty. With a calibrated value for the penalty
as well as the empirical moments by state, I use Equations 1, 2, and 3 to obtain the full welfare
effect, the net welfare effect, and the optimal penalty.
3.2 Empirical Implementation By State Policy Groupings
To make comparisons across states, I first separately calculate welfare within each state, and then I
regress state-level welfare on indicators for state policies. It would be tempting to simply compare
decreases in average costs in one state to decreases in average costs in another state and to claim
was adversely selected, and markups decreased, so the full welfare impact was unambiguously positive. However,
if the pre-reform market had been adversely selected but the markups had increased, then the full welfare impact
would have been ambiguous without further calculation. Similarly, if the pre-reform market had been advantageously
selected and markups had increased, then the full welfare impact would have been positive. However, if the pre-reform
market had been advantageously selected and markups had increased, as shown in Figure 3, then the full welfare
impact would have been ambiguous.
6According to CBO [2014], “Beginning in 2014, the ACA requires most legal residents of the United States to
obtain health insurance or pay a penalty. People who do not obtain coverage will pay the greater of two amounts:
either a flat dollar penalty per adult in a family, rising from $95 in 2014 to $695 in 2016 and indexed to inflation
thereafter (the penalty for a child is half the amount, and an overall cap will apply to family payments); or a percentage
of a household’s adjusted gross income in excess of the income threshold for mandatory tax-filing - a share that will
rise from 1.0 percent in 2014 to 2.5 percent in 2016 and subsequent years (also subject to a cap).” Subsidies, which
are based on income, are benchmarked to the cost of the second-lowest-cost silver plan in the exchanges. According
to CBO [2014], “CBO and JCT estimate that the average cost of individual policies for the second-lowest-cost silver
plan in the exchanges - the benchmark for determining exchange subsidies - is about $3,800 in 2014. That estimate
represents a national average, and it reflects CBO and JCTs projections of the age, sex, health status, and geographic
distribution of those who will obtain coverage through the exchanges in 2014.”
12
that the state that experienced greater decreases in average costs was more adversely selected prior
to reform. However, if the slope of the demand curve differed across states, this comparison alone
would not be sufficient to identify the welfare impact of reform. Thus, it is more informative to
compare changes in welfare across states because changes in welfare allow the demand curve to
have a different slope in each state.7
4 Data
I use data collected by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and compiled
by SNL Financial. The data include filings from all insurers in the comprehensive individual health
insurance line of business, excluding life insurers in all states and Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs) in the state of California. These data are more comprehensive than data from the health
insurance exchanges because they include policies sold outside of the exchanges. Under the ACA,
health insurers can sell policies inside and outside of the exchanges, but all policies must be included
in the same risk pool (ASPE [2014]). I compare my enrollment estimates to enrollment estimates
from the exchanges and survey data in Section 6.
I focus on the most recently-available data from the second quarter of 2014 and back through
the first quarter of 2008. Each insurer files quarterly and annual filings with the NAIC, which
include enrollment in member months, total premiums collected, and total costs paid. There are
393 insurers that have populated values for member months, costs, and premiums during at least
one of our quarters of interest.
Even though much of the regulation of the individual health insurance market is at the state
level, the NAIC requires quarterly and annual filings at the insurer level, and some insurers operate
in several states. Annual filings are broken down at the insurer-year-state of coverage level, but
quarterly filings are only broken down at the insurer-quarter level. Because I am interested in
examining the early impact of the Affordable Care Act at the state level without waiting for the
annual data, I use quarterly data from the first and second quarters of 2014.
Because I am using quarterly data, I need to make assumptions to allocate the data at the
7Although the slope of the demand curve differs across states, the model assumes that the demand curve shifts
according to a constant penalty/subsidy π that does not differ across states. This assumption makes sense given that
the premiums and subsidies are set nationally. However, to the extent that state policies themselves shift demand,
the model will attribute these shifts to changes in the slope, potentially biasing the welfare results but having no
effect on the slope of the average cost curve, from which we infer adverse or advantageous selection.
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insurer-quarter-state level. I predominantly infer state of coverage by using the corresponding
annual filings. For 2014, I use the percentages from the 2013 annual filing, since the 2014 annual
filing will not be available until the end of the year. In rare instances, I use supplemental quarterly
Schedule T filings to allocate the data by state. Of the 6,727 insurer-quarter observations (393
insurers operating in at least one of 26 quarters), I can uniquely allocate 5,728 to states because
the annual data only report coverage in a single state. These observations account for nearly 80%
of enrollment in member months, total premiums collected, and total costs paid. In such instances,
I allocate all insurer-quarter observations within that given year to the unique state.
For the remaining observations, I make assumptions to allocate the data by state using annual
filings and supplemental quarterly Schedule T filings if the annual data are not available. I detail
these assumptions in Appendix B. These procedures allow all insurer-quarter observations to be
allocated across the 50 states and the District of Columbia.
Before allocating data by state, I take several steps to clean the data, which I detail in Appendix
A. The ultimate effect of the data cleaning is rather minor, and as I show in the Online Appendix,
the main results are robust to the usage of the raw data instead of the clean data. It is not surprising
that the results are robust because I do not do anything to clean data from 2014. The 2014 data are
the main basis for the results, and the data from earlier years are just used to estimate pre-trends.8
I prefer the clean data, which imputes anomalous insurer-quarter observations instead of dropping
insurers from all quarters, because dropping insurers would make state totals less meaningful.
Even after data cleaning, the data from California and New Jersey do not appear to be complete.
SNL acknowledges that California HMO plans have different NAICS filing requirements, so those
data are not complete. The data from New Jersey are also incomplete.9 I report state-level statistics
for California and New Jersey in the interest of transparency, but I exclude them from comparisons
across groups of states to prevent data anomalies from driving the comparisons.
8I include graphs of the data by state using both the raw and the imputed data in the Online Appendix so that
the interested reader can examine state trends and the impact of my imputation technique.
9New Jersey does not require quarterly filings from insurers that only write business in the state of New Jersey.
Accordingly, Triad Healtcare of NJ, which is the largest insurer in New Jersey during the majority of our period,
does not report quarterly data during our period of interest.
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5 Summary Statistics
I present state-level summary statistics that are informative in their own right because they paint
a picture of the individual health insurance market in the first half of 2014. Furthermore, with only
six statistics for each state - coverage, premiums, and average costs before and after reform – I can
calculate the state-level impact of the implementation of the ACA on welfare. Simple comparisons
of the summary statistics within a state provide an intuitive basis for the welfare impact.
Coverage The first two columns of Table 1 depict average monthly enrollment I, in thousands,
before and after the implementation of the ACA by state. I∗, post gives average monthly enrollment
in the first half of 2014.10 I∗, pre gives an estimate of what enrollment would have been in the first
half of 2014 absent the implementation of the ACA, calculated according to equation 5. Therefore,
I∗, post − I∗, pre yields an estimate of the individual health insurance market coverage increase at-
tributable to the implementation of the ACA. In most states, the coverage increase attributable to
the ACA is substantial in percentage and level terms. Indeed, only 5 states, including California
and Massachusetts, which we omit from our state policy groupings, experienced coverage decreases
attributable to the ACA.11 To be clear, those states could have still experienced coverage increases
in level terms from 2013 to 2014, but they would not count as coverage increases attributable to
the ACA unless they exceeded coverage predicted given pre-reform seasonally-adjusted trends.
Figure 4 illustrates the importance of taking into account seasonally-adjusted trends by showing
quarterly trends in coverage in the four most populous states - Texas, New York, Florida, and
Illinois. The subfigures in the left column depict unadjusted coverage trends by quarter from the
first quarter of 2008 through the second quarter of 2014. In all four states, there is a striking
increase in coverage in the first quarter of 2014 followed by another large coverage increase in the
second quarter of 2014. Some increase in coverage in the second quarter of 2014 likely reflects new
coverage relative to the first quarter, but some is likely an artifact of the aggregation of the data by
10The data report quarterly enrollment in member months. To obtain average monthly enrollment in the first half
of 2014, I sum member months across both quarters of 2014 and divide by 6.
11As discussed above, we omit California because the SNL data do not include HMO enrollment, which likely
increased with reform. We omit Massachusetts because it had a similar reform to the ACA, but the ACA required
some changes in Massachusetts, making it difficult to compare Massachusetts to other states. Although the dif-
ference between I∗, pre and I∗, post in Massachusetts indicates that enrollment in Massachusetts declined relative
to a Massachusetts-specific seasonally-adjusted trend, enrollment in Massachusetts also declined in absolute terms.
Decreases in enrollment in Massachusetts likely reflect problems with the redesign of its state-based exchange.
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I*,pre		 I*,post P*,pre P*,post AC*,pre AC*,post
AK 10 65 387 346 242 187 1 1 16 10.8
AL 183 174 185 278 159 218 1 1 50 4.0
AR 100 193 179 271 145 181 0 1 19 7.7
AZ 128 179 234 254 183 192 0 1 59 3.1
CA* 871 226 218 243 175 256 1 0 792 0.5
CO 218 257 220 260 184 195 0 1 44 5.4
CT 58 100 335 403 285 250 1 1 66 3.3
DC 13 29 285 291 304 251 1 1 30 5.5
DE 14 21 368 346 265 279 0 0 53 2.9
FL 849 1,204 196 272 157 189 0 1 65 7.8
GA 411 557 188 261 150 167 0 1 48 6.5
HI 33 28 236 242 220 230 1 0 44 1.4
IA 140 180 241 265 206 236 0 0 14 6.7
ID 93 110 202 242 156 200 0 0 60 7.8
IL 330 524 260 326 221 267 0 1 36 4.7
IN 97 225 277 364 222 241 0 1 50 4.0
KS 79 139 153 200 117 166 0 0 37 5.3
KY 140 193 251 290 254 205 1 1 43 4.4
LA 164 227 243 292 174 198 0 1 39 5.6
MA* 326 210 438 479 400 413 1 1 16 3.0
MD 122 236 221 224 175 164 1 1 24 4.8
ME 17 45 413 411 410 247 1 1 78 4.3
MI 246 375 214 281 202 204 0 1 62 4.5
MN 218 274 230 256 192 259 0 0 17 5.3
MO 212 223 223 266 160 201 0 1 64 3.9
MS 49 69 216 265 166 177 0 1 84 2.4
MT 11 21 226 415 224 295 0 1 69 5.2
NC 395 554 240 310 203 212 0 1 56 6.5
ND 43 46 284 310 272 269 1 1 23 6.5
NE 79 89 253 277 208 233 0 0 50 4.6
NH 31 39 333 341 200 192 1 1 71 4.3
NJ* 28 79 530 331 550 298 1 1 190 1.0
NM 63 69 195 318 188 243 0 1 37 4.1
NV 50 106 222 209 187 163 1 1 40 4.1
NY 212 303 354 371 350 238 1 1 101 1.9
OH 289 301 213 280 149 207 0 1 46 2.9
OK 87 135 191 263 156 205 0 1 42 4.3
OR 150 199 235 290 200 271 0 0 30 5.7
PA 484 632 231 284 229 266 0 1 43 5.7
RI 17 32 367 363 315 283 1 1 74 3.7
SC 86 143 224 285 169 180 0 1 68 3.6
SD 63 72 249 274 215 250 0 0 17 9.0
TN 213 270 203 244 165 190 0 1 50 4.7
TX 737 1,037 167 243 153 187 0 1 61 4.5
UT 121 193 179 228 140 175 0 1 41 7.1
VA 278 343 254 280 198 203 0 1 55 4.7
VT 23 27 403 404 379 360 1 1 132 4.6
WA 284 237 285 337 218 259 1 1 69 3.4
WI 109 393 219 225 181 175 1 1 24 10.3
WV 15 27 271 378 270 306 0 1 58 1.9
















quarter. Since many people enrolled in coverage just before the open enrollment deadline of March
31, they were covered on March 31, but their average monthly enrollment over the course of the first
quarter of 2014 was low. Second quarter average monthly enrollment therefore likely gives a more
accurate picture of enrollment at the end of the first quarter. For our welfare analysis, we prefer
to aggregate the data across the entire first half of 2014. Plans generally cover individuals through
the end of the calendar year, so 2014 annual data will ultimately matter for the functioning of the
insurance pool. Therefore, we present data from the first half of 2014 in Table 1.12 We present
unadjusted quarterly data analogous to that in Figure 4 in the Online Appendix. Almost all states
show striking increases in coverage in 2014.
Aggregating I∗, post across all states, we find that 11.4 million people were covered in the indi-
vidual health insurance market, on average in each month for the first six months of 2014. This
number understates true coverage in the individual health insurance market because the data do
not report enrollment in HMO plans in California and enrollment for one very large insurer is not
reported in New Jersey. It also understates true coverage at the end of June 2014 because coverage
increased over time - 9.9 million people were covered per month in the first quarter of 2014, and
12.9 million people were covered per month in the second quarter of 2014.
Because not all people enrolled for all three months of the second quarter of 2014, the actual
number of people enrolled at many points throughout the second quarter of 2014 was higher than
12.9 million. Although we prefer to use coverage in member months for our main analysis because
premiums and costs are monthly, we can obtain a separate quarterly enrollment series from the
SNL data. We present state-level statistics from the enrollment series in the Online Appendix.
According to that series, there were 13.2 million people enrolled in the second quarter of 2014.
From our summary statistics, we can obtain total enrollment in the individual health insurance
market attributable to the implementation of the ACA as the sum of I∗, post − I∗, pre across all
states. Averaged across the first six months of 2014, we find that the coverage increase in the
individual health insurance market attributable to the implementation of the ACA was 2.4 million
people. Using the quarterly enrollment series, of the 13.2 million people covered in the second
quarter of 2014, we attribute 4.2 million to the implementation of the ACA. Stated another way,
12However, to obtain national enrollment estimates that are as up-to-date as possible, we only use data from the
second quarter of 2014, in an analogous table to Table 1, which we present in the Online Appendix. In those data,
we re-estimate the seasonally-adjusted trends so that I∗, pre takes on slightly different values.
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from before the reform to the second quarter of 2014, national enrollment in the individual health
insurance market increased by 32% beyond what it would have had it simply followed state-level
seasonally-adjusted trends. We note that enrollment in the individual health insurance market that
we attribute to the implementation of the ACA does not necessarily represent new coverage for
individuals who were previously uninsured – it could also represent new coverage for individuals
who previously had a different type of insurance.
These national estimates complement existing estimates of health insurance enrollment under
the ACA. A widely-cited report from the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evalua-
tion (ASPE) at the Department of Health and Human Services finds that 8 million people enrolled
in health insurance exchanges through March 31, including individuals who enrolled during the
additional special enrollment period that was put in place through April 19 for individuals who
had attempted to enroll by March 31, the last day of the open season (ASPE [2014]).13 Our esti-
mate of 13.2 million people covered per month in the second quarter of 2014 is larger for two main
reasons: it uses more recent data, and it includes individual health insurance enrollment outside of
the exchanges. One strength of my data over the ASPE data is that they allow for the calculation
of pre-trends that I can use to isolate the impact of the ACA on enrollment in the individual health
insurance market. The ASPE data necessarily do not include enrollment from before 2014 because
most of the exchanges began providing coverage in 2014. While all exchange coverage was “new,”
in some sense, my analysis of pre-trends suggests that only 4.2 million enrollees can be attributable
to the ACA nationally. One limitation of my data relative to the ASPE data is that I cannot
directly separate exchange coverage from other coverage.
To get a sense of what fraction of coverage in my data is purchased on exchanges, I present
ASPE exchange enrollment as a percentage of the SNL quarterly enrollment series in Table 1.
Nationally, the ASPE report accounts for approximately 70% of enrollment observed in my data.
However, ASPE exchange enrollment as a fraction of enrollment in my data varies dramatically
by state, from a low of 14% in Iowa. In some states the fraction exceeds 100%. This occurs most
prominently in California and New Jersey, states subject to severe under-reporting of enrollment in
my data. In other states, exchange enrollment can exceed enrollment in my data because I allocate
13HHS Secretary Sylvia Matthews Burwell [2014] announced in September 2014 that 7.3 million people were enrolled
in the exchanges and had paid their premiums. The earlier enrollment of 8 million included those who had signed up
without yet paying their premiums.
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total enrollment by state with some error, as discussed in Section 4. This measurement error does
not affect my national enrollment estimates.
Beyond the widely-cited figures from ASPE, which are based on administrative data like my
own, I can also compare my national enrollment estimates to estimates from other sources. Based
on a variety of sources, the CBO projects 6 million people will enrolled on the exchanges over the
full course of 2014, which is broadly in line with the ASPE report and my data. Survey estimates
differ more substantially. Based on the RAND Health Reform Opinion Study (HROS), Carman
and Eibner [2014b] find a much lower estimate of 3.9 million enrolled in exchange plans nationally
as of March 28, 2014. This estimate is likely low because many interviews took place early in
March before the surge in enrollment at the end of the month. The Urban Institute Health Reform
Monitoring Survey showed that 5.4 million previously uninsured people gained coverage between
September 2013 and March 31, 2014 (Long et al. [2014]). This estimate is not directly comparable
to the other estimates because it accounts for marketplace and Medicaid enrollment and it focuses
on the previously uninsured. This estimate also does not capture the surge of late March 2014, as
most of the data were collected by March 6. McKinsey and Gallup conducted surveys about health
insurance coverage in 2014, but I am not aware of any national enrollment estimates based on their
results (Bhardwaj et al. [2014], Gallup [2014]). Estimates from often-used national surveys such
as the American Community Survey (ACS), the Current Population Survey (CPS), the Behavioral
Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP),
the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), and the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
are not yet available.
To put total enrollment in my data into a context that facilitates better comparison with
survey data, I divide total quarterly enrollment in the second quarter of 2014 by 2013 U.S. Census
population estimates in the last column of Table 1. I see that Alaska is the state with the largest
enrollment in percentage terms, with 10.8% of the population enrolled. Nationally, only 3% of the
population is enrolled in the individual health insurance market monthly in the first half of 2013.
Given the small fraction of the population enrolled in the market, it will be very difficult to obtain
accurate estimates of the impact of national reform on enrollment in the individual health insurance
market using survey data unless the survey is very large or very focused. The 4.2 million person
individual health insurance market coverage increase that I attribute to the ACA using data from
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the second quarter of 2014 is only a 1.3 percentage point coverage increase nationally.
Premium In the column labeled P ∗, post, in Table 1, I show that in the first half of 2014,
there was wide variation in average monthly premiums paid by state, with insurers in Kansas
collecting average premiums per enrollee of $200 per month and insurers in several other states
collecting average premiums per enrollee in excess of $400 per month.14 In the vast majority of
states, premiums went up relative to state seasonally-adjusted trends in the first quarter of 2014.
Health insurance premiums almost always go up, but it is impressive that they went up so much
relative to trend. As shown in Figure 4, premiums in all four of the most populous states increased
relative to seasonally-adjusted trends in the first half of 2014.15 Across all states, from before the
reform to the first half of 2014, enrollment-weighted premiums in the individual health insurance
market increased by 24.4% beyond what they would have had they simply followed state-level
seasonally-adjusted trends.16
The premium increase that we observe reflects unsubsidized premiums. Insurers receive the
full premiums each month, regardless of whether they are paid by the individual or the federal
government [IRS, 2014]. Thus, though our data reflect premiums received by insurers, individuals
likely faced smaller changes in premiums after taking the subsidy into account.17
An article in Forbes magazine also examines changes in unsubsidized premiums from before to
after the ACA by scraping the Internet for premiums for a standardized plan in select counties in
2013 and 2014 [Roy, 2014]. It concludes that the ACA increased individual health insurance market
premiums by an average of 49%. This estimate is even higher than my estimate, likely because
it is not enrollment-weighted, and individuals in areas with high premiums likely selected cheaper
plans.
Aside from the Forbes article, I am not aware of any other sources that estimate premium
14The data report total premiums collected separately by quarter for the first two quarters of 2014. To obtain
average premiums collected in the first half of 2014, I sum premiums collected in both quarters, and I divide by
the sum of enrollment in member months in both quarters such that my statistic is weighted by average monthly
enrollment. Movements in premiums over time within a year reflect changes in enrollment into and across plans as
premiums for a given plan do not generally change within a year.
15The increase in New York was less pronounced, but it started from a much higher level. As we discuss below, New
York had a different regulatory environment than the other three states before the implementation of the national
reform.
16I obtained this number by calculating the percentage change in the monthly enrollment-weighted national average




national, excluding Massachusetts, California, and New Jersey.
17Discussions with NAIC and SNL confirm that we cannot separately observe subsidizes in our data.
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changes from before to after the ACA. ASPE [2013] examines premium trends before the ACA and
Cox et al. [2014] examines premium trends from select cities from 2014 to 2015, finding a widely-
cited estimate that unsubsidized premiums will decrease by an average of -0.8% from 2014 to 2015,
but these studies do not address premium changes from before to after the ACA. Before the passage
of the ACA in 2009, the CBO predicted that the average enrollment-weighted individual health
insurance premium would be 10 to 13 percent higher in 2016 under the ACA relative to current
law, and the CBO revised their estimate downward by 15% in April of 2014. On the whole, the
CBO estimates are in the same ballbark as the estimates borne out in my data. One reason why
the CBO predicts lower premium increases relative to trend is that it estimated trends prior to the
national slowdown in health spending (see Chandra et al. [2013]).
Average Cost In the column labeled AC∗, post in Table 1, I report average costs incurred by
insurers in the first half of 2014. Average cost decreases are particularly striking in the states where
they occurred because just as health insurance premiums almost always go up, average costs do too.
In many states, average cost not only went down relative to trend, but also average cost went down
in absolute terms. Average costs decreased relative to trend in 19 states and increased relative
to trend in all others. Nationally, I find that from before the reform to the first half of 2014,
average costs in the individual health insurance market increased by 11% relative to state-level
seasonally-adjusted trends.18
Assuming that plan generosity remained constant, coverage increases combined with decreases
in average costs indicates that the pre-reform market was adversely selected (lower-cost people
gained coverage after reform). However, a small number of states experienced coverage decreases,
so in those states, an increase in average costs indicates adverse selection (because as the market
shrunk, healthier people exited). Taking into account reported (I∗,post−I∗,pre) as well as (AC∗,post−
AC∗,pre), I indicate those states that exhibit adverse selection with a dummy variable in the column
labeled “Adverse Selection?”. Other states exhibit advantageous selection.
I can compare my estimates of cost changes and adverse vs. advantageous selection at the
state level to state-level predictions made in a report by the Society of Actuaries in 2013 for the
state of the individual health insurance market in 2017. Relying on survey data from the MEPS
18I obtained this number by calculating the percentage change in the monthly enrollment-weighted national average




national, excluding Massachusetts, California, and New Jersey.
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and the CPS, the report simulates changes in coverage and costs for each state and the District
of Columbia. The report predicts increases in coverage and costs in most states, which are borne
out in my data. At the national level, the report predicts a 32% increase in costs as a result
of the ACA; however, there is wide variability across states, with cost changes ranging from a
decrease of 14% to an increase of 81%. My data also show a great deal of variability in average
cost changes, but I estimate a much smaller national cost increase of 11%. Combining the Society
of Actuaries predictions for coverage and costs and assuming no change in plan generosity, their
predictions imply that five states – Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and
Vermont – exhibited pre-reform adverse selection. My data imply adverse selection in all of these
states except Massachusetts, which I exclude from analysis for aforementioned reasons.
It is important to note that findings of adverse selection within states are subject to change
over time. Because individuals pay their premiums first and then incur costs, average costs could
be artificially low relative to premiums in the start of 2014. Indeed, when we infer adverse selection
based on data from the first quarter of 2014 alone, as shown in the Online Appendix, we find that
a much larger number of states - 32 states - were adversely selected prior to reform. Figure 4 shows
that although there was an initial striking decline in average costs in the first quarter of 2014, there
was a subsequent, even more striking increase in average costs in Texas and Illinois. However,
average costs in New York decreased in the first quarter of 2014 and remained below trend in the
second quarter, perhaps due to the influence of its differential pre-reform regulatory environment,
which could have exacerbated adverse selection. While average costs patterns are likely to change
over time for several reasons, including pent up demand among the newly covered, the relative
changes across groups of states with different policies are likely to be more robust. Therefore, we
focus on comparing welfare across states rather than within states.
Taking welfare within states at face value for now, we see some evidence that the coverage
expansions experienced under the ACA improved welfare by reducing adverse selection in the in-
dividual health insurance market. Even given the evidence on average costs, to know the sign of
the full welfare impact of the ACA as defined by the model, we also need to show the impact of
the reform on markups. Even in the states with pre-reform adverse selection, increased markups
could lessen or reverse the welfare gains from reform. The column labeled “Markup Increase?”
reports a dummy variable that is equal to one if (P ∗,post − C∗,post) − (P ∗,pre − C∗,pre) > 0, indi-
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cating that markups increased. Markups increased in 41 states. As shown in Figure 4, markups
increased dramatically in Florida without a corresponding increase in average costs. These changes
in markups could reflect uncertainty on the behalf of the actuaries that had to set premiums with-
out knowing the health status of the individuals likely to enroll. If these increases in markups
persist, they could result in the ACA having an overall negative welfare impact in the individual
health insurance market.
6 Results
6.1 Welfare Results by State
Using only summary statistics presented in the first six columns of Table 1, and three different
calibrated values of the annual penalty of $1,000, $1,500, and $2,000, I calculate changes in welfare
for each state. For each value of the penalty for each state, I calculate the full change in welfare
due to changes in selection and changes in markups according to Equation 1, and I calculate the
change in welfare due to changes in selection assuming that changes in markups remained constant
according to Equation 2. To make the welfare impacts easier to compare across states, I divide the
welfare effects by post-reform enrollment and report Wsel/I
∗, post and Wfull/I
∗, post in Table A1. In
that table, I also present the optimal tax penalty calculated according to Equation 3. As discussed
above, I place more emphasis on comparisons across states than I do on changes in welfare within
a state since coverage, premiums, and average costs are still evolving for 2014.
Nonetheless, taking changes in welfare from before to after the ACA within each state at face
value, my results show that the reform increased welfare in 11-18 states, depending on the calibrated
value of the annual penalty. These welfare increases generally occurred in states in which average
costs decreased but increases in markups did not outweigh the welfare gains from reductions in
adverse selection.19 Among the states that we include in the state groupings, at a penalty of
$1,500, Maine saw the largest welfare gain. The results indicate a welfare gain of $126 per month
per market participant over the first six months of 2014. If this welfare gain persists throughout
19The calculated changes in welfare are still valid under other conditions, but they are more subtle to interpret.
For example, the welfare calculation is still valid when demand is upward-sloping, but it is unlikely that demand is
actually upward-sloping. In 46 states, demand is downward-sloping for all calibrated values of the penalty. The data
for Massachusetts and California suggest upward-sloping demand, giving further credence to our decision to eliminate
those states from state groupings.
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2014, it will translate into an annual welfare gain of $1,512 (=126*12) per market participant. In
contrast, among the states that we include in the state groupings, Oregon saw the largest decrease
in welfare at the same penalty value - a decrease of $66 per market participant, which will translate
into $792 annually.
Given the observed full change in welfare, I report the optimal annual penalty 12π∗, for each
calibrated value of the annual penalty 12π, for each state. As most states experienced welfare
decreases, it is not surprising that I find that the penalty is too large. In most states, I find that
the optimal penalty is smaller than the calibrated penalty because those states exhibit advanta-
geous selection, so optimal coverage should be lower than observed coverage. Again, I expect the
calculated optimal penalty to change with time.
Finally, I report per-enrollee changes in welfare due to changes in selection Wsel/I
∗, post. Because
changes in markups were so pronounced, it is non-trivial to hold markups constant to calculate
the change in welfare due to changes in adverse selection, using Equation 2, leading to nonsensical
values in some states. Furthermore, given the observed changes in markups, markup changes could
have such important real welfare impacts that it would not make sense to focus exclusively on
selection. Therefore, in the analysis that follows by state groupings, we only compare the full
welfare impact across states.
6.2 Welfare Results by State Policy Groupings
I compare per-enrollee changes in welfare in the individual health insurance market Wfull/I
∗, post
across states along eight policy dimensions. As discussed above, the only states that I exclude
are California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, which are denoted with asterisks in the tables. I
include the District of Columbia as a “state.” I consider the effect of each policy on the state-level
welfare impact of the ACA on the individual health insurance market, alone and controlling for
other policies.
Direct Enforcement I first categorize states into five mutually-exclusive groups, based on
their involvement in the implementation of the ACA. On one end of the spectrum are the five states
that ceded all authority to implement the ACA to the Federal government. The federal government
refers to these states as the “direct enforcement” states (CMS [2014]). Table 2 and identifies the
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five direct enforcement states as Alabama, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas and Wyoming. Figure 5
depicts the direct enforcement states on a map that divides states according to my implementation
spectrum. Since support for the ACA is low in direct enforcement states, it is likely that outreach
efforts to increase enrollment are less targeted in these states, resulting in lower enrollment of
healthy individuals.






The first row of Figure 6 shows trends in total coverage for groups of states with and without
direct enforcement, weighted by enrollment. As shown in the left subfigure, states with direct
enforcement made up a small share of total coverage before the introduction of the ACA. Although
we observe slight coverage increases in states with direct enforcement in the first and second quarters
of 2014, increases in coverage were dramatically higher in states without direct enforcement.
The middle subfigure of Figure 6 show trends in enrollment-weighted premiums. Premiums
in direct enforcement states began lower than premiums in other states, but they almost caught
up in the first two quarters of 2014. As shown in the right subfigure, which shows enrollment-
weighted average costs on the same scale, the increase in premiums in direct enforcement states
appears necessary to cover the observed increases in average costs. Although average costs in
direct enforcement states started out much lower than average costs in other states, they surpassed
average costs in other states in the second quarter of 2014. Assuming that plan generosity remained
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AK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
AL 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
AR 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4
AZ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 6
CA* 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
CO 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 13
CT 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 5
DC 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 7
DE 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4
FL 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 18
GA 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 12
HI 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 3
IA 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 4
ID 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 6
IL 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 9
IN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
KS 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7
KY 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 7
LA 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6
MA* 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 12
MD 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 8
ME 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 5
MI 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 23
MN 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 9
MO 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 11
MS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
MT 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
NC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5
ND 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 4
NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
NH 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 3
NJ* 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 8
NM 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 3
NV 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 9
NY 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 17
OH 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 15
OK 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
OR 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 9
PA 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 22
RI 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 2
SC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6
SD 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6
TN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5
TX 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 18
UT 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 6
VA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
VT 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 3
WA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 11
WI 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 15
WV 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 4
WY 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
*States	  with	  data	  anomalies	  omitted	  from	  state-­‐level	  welfare	  regression	  analysis.	  	  MA	  is	  also	  omitted.
Source:	  Various,	  see	  text	  for	  more	  details.
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constant, the increase in average costs observed in direct enforcement states indicates that sicker
people enrolled in coverage after reform. However, as discussed above, we cannot make solid claims
about the welfare impact of ACA due to changes in selection by making comparisons across groups
of states without using the model.
In the top panel of Table 3, we present results from a regression in which we regress state-level
changes in welfare per enrollee attributable to the ACA, Wfull/I
∗, post, on a dummy variable for
direct enforcement and a constant. In each of the three columns, the underlying data reflect a
different value of the calibrated penalty π. In the second column, reflecting an annual penalty of
$1,500, we see that enrollees in the individual health insurance market in direct enforcement states
are $23 worse off per month than enrollees in other states. If these losses persist, which I expect they
will, at least until the end of 2014, then the annual welfare loss for enrollees in direct enforcement
states relative to enrollees in other states will be approximately $275 (obtained by multiplying
the monthly coefficient by 12). Controlling for other state policies that we discuss below in the
multivariate regression results shown in the second panel of Table 3, the comparable welfare loss is
$245 per year. Varying the magnitude of the calibrated annual penalty by $500 around the baseline
penalty has a small impact on the estimated losses. In all regression results, this loss is statistically
different from zero at the 1% level, according to confidence intervals block-bootstrapped by state.20
State Exchange We next compare states based on whether they implemented their own
exchanges, following Kaiser Family Foundation [2014b]. As shown in Table 2, 15 states implemented
their own exchanges.21 As shown in Figure 5, states that implemented their own exchanges fall
on the opposite end of the implementation spectrum from the direct enforcement states. States
that set up their own exchanges were generally states that had stronger enthusiasm for the ACA
and thus, they might have solicited enrollment with more enthusiasm. The one countervailing
factor, which we consider immediately below, is that several state-based exchanges had high profile
20The block-bootstrapping by state does not account for the prediction of I∗,pre, P ∗,pre, or AC∗,pre in the under-
lying state-level welfare estimates because those predictions take place within states. Block-bootstrapping the data
generating process and regressions by state-quarter would account for the prediction of I∗,pre, P ∗,pre, or AC∗,pre,
but the relevant unit of analysis for our regression is the state and not the state-quarter. The same issues apply
to clustering by state. We prefer block bootstrapping to clustering on theoretical grounds because it requires fewer
parametric assumptions. In practice, both results yield very similar confidence intervals, and we do not lose statistical
significance for any of our estimated parameters if we instead cluster by state.
21Idaho and New Mexico have been approved to implement their own exchanges, but they used the federal exchange
in 2014, so we consider Idaho and New Mexico to be non-exchange states.
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Table 3: Impact of State Policies on Welfare by State
12π	=	1000 12π	=	1500 12π	=	2000
Direct	Enforcement ‐24.64 ‐23.12 ‐21.61
[‐47.67,‐13.14]*** [‐41.26,‐11.84]*** [‐37.92,‐10.75]***
State	Exchange 22.26 23.49 24.73
[‐15.55,68.16] [‐15.45,63.47] [‐11.33,66.44]
Exchange	Glitches ‐17.33 ‐18.07 ‐18.81
[‐51.77,31.79] [‐50.71,28.03] [‐52.7,26.44]
Medicaid	Expansion 7.45 8.32 9.18
[‐16.51,33.21] [‐15.58,32.54] [‐11.38,35.79]
Non‐Grandfathered	Plans ‐18.51 ‐18.45 ‐18.39
[‐49.03,8.4] [‐45.22,5.68] [‐47.2,6.37]
Community	Rating 10.13 11.85 13.57
[‐22.37,50] [‐20.29,47.85] [‐16.88,49.45]
Guaranteed	Issue 9.41 11.45 13.48
[‐29.96,62.94] [‐26.57,60.01] [‐24.55,59.07]
Number	of	Insurers ‐0.52 ‐0.52 ‐0.52
[‐1.96,1.83] [‐1.93,1.49] [‐1.83,1.69]
Direct	Enforcement ‐22.72 ‐20.39 ‐18.07
[‐57.44,‐8.74]*** [‐50.38,‐6.74]*** [‐47.43,‐5.73]***
State	Exchange 46.73 48.67 50.60
[‐2.52,101.03]* [‐0.72,99.50]* [3.22,98.17]**
Exchange	Glitches ‐60.45 ‐62.94 ‐65.43
[‐129.97,6.39]* [‐123.82,6.73]* [‐125.60,4.63]*
Medicaid	Expansion ‐13.60 ‐13.15 ‐12.70
[‐39.07,11.32] [‐35.55,9.23] [‐35.67,11.21]
Non‐Grandfathered	Plans ‐11.54 ‐10.62 ‐9.70
[‐37.12,13.59] [‐33.11,13.44] [‐29.74,16.35]
Community	Rating ‐3.78 ‐2.68 ‐1.59
[‐32.14,32.48] [‐28.39,29.07] [‐29.46,27.70]
Guaranteed	Issue 1.44 2.87 4.31
[‐38.93,39.35] [‐32.01,39.44] [‐27.49,44.18]
Number	of	Insurers ‐0.31 ‐0.34 ‐0.37
[‐2.48,2.22] [‐2.31,2.05] [‐2.28,1.69]













implementation glitches which could have affected enrollment.
Figure 6 shows that average costs decreased substantially relative to trend in the first quarter of
2014 in states that implemented their own exchanges, indicating that lower-cost individuals selected
into the pool, if we assume that plan generosity remained constant. However, costs picked back
up again in second quarter of 2014. Averaging across the first two quarters of 2014, costs were
below trend, indicating that there could have been some welfare gains from reductions in adverse
selection. However, premiums grew markedly in these states, suggesting potential welfare losses
from increased markups.
In Table 3, the regression results show that if we do not control for any other state-level policies,
at the baseline penalty value, enrollees in states that set up their own exchanges were better off by
about $23.50 per month, which will translate into $282 (=23.49*12) annually. This coefficient is
not statistically different from zero, but it doubles and becomes statistically different from zero at
the 10% level when we control for whether the exchange had an implementation glitch and whether
the state expanded Medicaid, among other policies. We defer interpretation of the latter results
until we have considered these two other policies.
Exchange Glitches Exchange glitches reflect states policies in the sense that states that set
up exchanges were responsible for the selection of a vendor. In our characterization of state policies,
only states that set up their own exchanges had implementation glitches, even though the federal
exchange had its own difficulties. Following Dash and Thomas [2014] and other widespread media
reports, six states with their own exchanges - Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada,
and Oregon - had severe technology problems. Several sources have questioned whether these
technology problems could have lasting affects on the welfare impact of the ACA, including research
by Scheuer and Smetters [2014]. If those snags deterred lower-cost individuals from navigating the
system to purchase coverage before the open season ended, then the reductions in adverse selection
expected with the implementation of the ACA might not have been as great. Furthermore, the
high future premiums necessitated by current adverse selection could deter future enrollees.
In the third panel of Figure 6, we compare states with exchange glitches to all other states, and
we do not notice any remarkable patterns. However, the impact of glitches is more salient when we
restrict our focus to states with state exchanges in Figure 7. In this figure, there is no clearly visible
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hindrance to enrollment in states with glitches. In fact, enrollment began increasing in states with
glitches in the fourth quarter of 2013, sooner than it increased in other states. Furthermore, states
with and without glitches experienced similar changes in premiums, which is to be expected given
that actuaries would not have known in advance which states would experience glitches.
Though enrollment and premium trends are similar, there is a clearly visible difference in average
costs. In the states with well-functioning state exchanges, average costs decreased substantially in
the first quarter of 2014 while remaining in line with trends in the comparison states. This decline
is particularly striking because it seems intuitive that states without glitches would have to start
paying claims sooner because their beneficiaries could enroll sooner. While average costs increased
in the second quarter of 2014 in states with well-functioning state exchanges, they remained below
trend, suggesting that those states succeeded in enrolling healthier individuals if we assume constant
plan generosity. In contrast, states with exchange glitches saw marked increases in average costs
in the second quarter of 2014.
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Given this visual evidence, the regression evidence shown in Table 3 is not surprising. The
coefficients show that states with exchange glitches are worse off than other states. The difference
is not statistically significant in the univariate regression, but it triples in magnitude and becomes
statistically significant at the 10% level in the regression that controls for other state policies,
including whether states expanded Medicaid. We defer the interpretation of the magnitude until
we have considered state policy on the Medicaid expansion.
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Medicaid Expansion The Supreme Court gave the states the power to decide whether to
expand Medicaid as legislated by the ACA. 27 states are currently implementing the Medicaid
expansion, and Pennsylvania is set to implement it starting in 2015 (Kaiser Family Foundation
[2014b]). In states that implemented the Medicaid expansion, fewer individuals might have turned
to the individual health insurance market for coverage because Medicaid was available to them. In
that case, the impact on adverse selection depends on whether the Medicaid-eligibles are higher or
lower cost than other participants in the individual health insurance market.
Using Figure 6, we can examine trends in states that implemented the ACA Medicaid expansion
vs. those that did not. In the bottom left subfigure, we see that states that did not implement
the Medicaid expansion saw greater increases in individual health insurance market coverage than
other states. It could be the case that more individuals turned to the individual health insurance
market for new coverage in states in which they were not eligible for Medicaid. It could also be the
case that individuals who had individual health insurance market coverage exited it for Medicaid
coverage. Whatever the mechanism, if the new Medicaid eligibles were sicker than the rest of
the population and the Medicaid expansion crowded them out of the individual health insurance
market, then I expect a differential decrease in average costs in those states that implemented the
expansion. Indeed, such a decrease is visible in the first quarter of 2014, as shown in Figure 6.
However, average costs increased dramatically in the second quarter of 2014 such that average costs
over the first half of 2014 were only slightly lower than predicted.
Indeed, the univariate regression results in the bottom of Table 3 show suggestive evidence that
states that adopted the Medicaid expansion were better off than all other states by approximately
$100 (approximately 8.32*12) per year, but this difference is not statistically distinguishable from
zero. At first glance, the multivariate regression results appear to show a different story. However,
the Medicaid expansion is highly correlated the three other policies that we have discussed, so we
must consider them all simultaneously.
As shown in Table 2, all 15 states that set up their own exchanges also implemented the
Medicaid expansion. Another group of states took less of an active role by implementing the
Medicaid expansion but not setting up an exchange. Therefore, we can fill in the middle of the
ACA implementation spectrum shown in Figure 5 with the 12 states that implemented the Medicaid
expansion but did not set up their own exchanges. The final group of “passive” states were not so
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extreme as to leave direct enforcement to the federal government, but they did not set up a state
exchange, and they did not implement the Medicaid expansion—these states are in the category
omitted from the first four state policies presented in the multivariate regression results. (The
next four included state policies included in the multivariate regression do not fit neatly onto this
spectrum).
Therefore, the coefficient on “Medicaid expansion” in the multivariate regression results gives
the welfare impact of deciding to expand Medicaid, among states that did not opt for direct
enforcement on one side of the spectrum or for a state exchange on the other side of the spectrum.
To recover the welfare impact of setting up a state exchange with a glitch relative to the “passive”
states, we add together the coefficients on “State Exchange,” “Exchange Glitches,” and “Medicaid
expansion.” We find the participants in the individual health insurance market in states that set up
exchanges with glitches were worse off than they would have been had their states been “passive” -
at the baseline value of the calibrated penalty, they were worse off by $27 (=48.67-62.94-13.15) per
month or $330 (=27.42*12) annually. In contrast, participants in states that set up well-functioning
exchanges were better off than they would have been had their states been “passive,” by $426
(=(48.67-13.15)*12) annually. Therefore, the impact of having an exchange glitch far outweighs
the impact of the other policy decisions that we have considered thus far. Market participants in
the six states that had severe exchange glitches are worse off by approximately $750 (approximately
330+426) per participant on an annualized basis, relative to participants in other states with their
own exchanges.
Non-Grandfathered Plans Next, I compare states on the basis of whether they allowed
beneficiaries to renew non-grandfathered plans that did not meet the standards for coverage required
by the ACA. As shown in Table 2, just over half of states allow renewal of non-grandfathered plans
(NCSL Health Reform Task Force [2013]). The decision to allow non-grandfathered plans appears
to be separate from other state decisions, as direct enforcement states, state exchange states, and
Medicaid expansion states do not have uniform policies on non-grandfathered plans.
If the beneficiaries enrolled in non-grandfathered plans are lower-cost than other beneficiaries,
then the general individual market health insurance pool might have experienced smaller reduc-
tions in adverse selection with the implementation of the ACA. The Congressional Budget Office
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(CBO), the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), a former Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices (CMS) senior actuary, and researchers from the Rand Corporation all predict that healthier
individuals will remain in non-ACA-compliant plans, but they differ in their assessment of whether
the market-level impact will be large or small (See CBO [2014], Bertko [2014], and Saltzman and
Eibner [2014]). I address this question empirically.
Figure 8 shows trends in states that allow renewal of non-grandfathered plans relative to trends
in all other states. As shown in the top left subfigure, states with non-grandfathered plans clearly
experienced greater coverage increases in absolute terms and relative to trend than other states.
Perhaps allowing individuals to keep their plans encouraged them to remain in the individual health
insurance market instead of seeking other forms of coverage. As shown in the next two subfigures,
though premiums increased more in states with non-grandfathered plans, it is difficult to discern
any differential movements in average costs.
In the top panel of Table 3, the coefficients on “Non-Grandfathered plans” gives suggestive
evidence that participants in the individual health insurance market in states that allow renewal of
non-grandfathered plans are worse off from the implementation of the ACA by approximately $18
per month, $221 (=18.45*12) annually. However, this difference is not statistically different from
zero. If we control for other state policies, we find results that are half as large, and they are still
not statistically different from zero. Therefore, we see suggestive evidence that the allowed renewal
of non-ACA complaint plans has a negative impact on the individual health insurance market, but
time will tell if this evidence is conclusive.
Community Rating and Guaranteed Issue We next compare states on the basis of two
individual health insurance market regulations that are often implemented jointly. First, we com-
pare states on the basis of “community rating” regulations that require all health insurers to charge
the same price to all beneficiaries, regardless of observable characteristics. As shown in Table 2,
19 states had such restrictions before the implementation of the ACA (Kaiser Family Foundation
[2014a]). These regulations could exacerbate adverse selection by increasing asymmetric informa-
tion between insurers and beneficiaries: if insurers cannot charge lower prices to healthy beneficiaries
and must instead charge the average price to all beneficiaries, only sick beneficiaries will find it
worthwhile to enroll and the community rated price will be the average price for the sick.
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Second, we compare states on the basis of “guaranteed issue” regulations that prevent insur-
ers from denying coverage to applicants, regardless of their health status. As shown in Table 2,
13 states had such restrictions before the implementation of the ACA, 4 of which did not have
accompanying community rating regulations.22 These regulations alone need not induce adverse
selection. However, they could exacerbate adverse selection in the presence of community rating
regulations because in the presence of both regulations, insurers must accept all comers and charge
them the same price.
The ACA establishes community rating and guaranteed issue regulations nationally in 2014.
These regulations have been some of the most popular provisions of the ACA because people like
the idea of being able to purchase health insurance regardless of health status at a uniform price.
However, in the absence of the individual mandate, one of the least popular provisions of the ACA,
these regulations could exacerbate adverse selection. By comparing states with these regulations
before and after the implementation of the ACA, I isolate the impact of these regulations from the
individual mandate.
As shown in the middle rows of Figure 8, states with community rating and guaranteed issue
regulations experienced coverage increases smaller than those experienced in other states. Given
particular interest in the welfare cost of adverse selection imposed by community rating and guar-
anteed issue regulations, we are especially interested in differential changes in average costs before
and after the ACA for states that already had those regulations relative to states that implemented
them with the ACA. As discussed above, we expect more adverse selection in states with commu-
nity rating and guaranteed issue regulations. Therefore, holding the slope of the demand curve
and its shift constant, we expect a greater decline in average costs in states with these regulations.
Such a pattern could be there, but it is difficult to discern graphically.
Turning to the regression results in Table 3, we see that when we examine community rating and
guaranteed issue regulations individually, not controlling for any other state policies, the signs of the
coefficients suggest that states with these policies had higher welfare gains from the establishment of
the ACA than other states. Multiplying the community rating or guaranteed issue coefficient from
the middle column by 12 suggests that individuals in states with either one of these regulations will
better off from the implementation of the ACA by approximately $140 annually, possibly because
22We define the guaranteed-issue states as states in which all insurers must issue all or some products, either
periodically or continuously (Kaiser Family Foundation [2013].
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these regulations induced, or exacerbated, adverse selection in the pre-ACA market.
These estimated welfare gains for states with community rating/guaranteed issue regulations
under the ACA are less than half as large than the annual welfare gains of $442 per person experi-
enced in Massachusetts following its reform, as calculated by HKK. Massachusetts had community
rating and guaranteed issue regulations that could have exacerbated adverse selection before its
reform. However, HKK shows that Massachusetts experienced welfare gains from reductions in
adverse selection and from decreases in markups, whereas most states seem to have experienced
increases in markups under the ACA. HKK use annual SNL filings, as opposed quarterly filings, so
comparison to Massachusetts will be more conclusive when the 2014 annual filings become available.
Although it is interesting to analyze the magnitudes of the community rating and guaranteed
issue coefficients, they are not statistically different from zero. Furthermore, the community rating
coefficient changes sign in the multivariate regression. Therefore, these results are inconclusive as
of the second quarter of 2014.
Number of Insurers Finally, I compare states on the basis of how many insurers were
operating in their individual health insurance markets in the third quarter of 2013, just before
ACA open enrollment began. Although the number of insurers in the market is not technically a
state policy, it could reflect other state policy decisions. I obtain the number of insurers directly
from the SNL data. As shown in the last column of Table 2, there was widespread variation in the
number of insurers by state before the implementation of the ACA, from three or fewer in 11 states
to 9 or more in 17 states.23 We might expect the individual health insurance market to function
better in states with more insurers (see Dafny [2010], Haislmaier [2013], and Dafny et al. [2014]).
Therefore, to the extent that the individual health insurance market was already functioning well in
states with more insurers, the welfare impact of the ACA might not be as positive in those states.
Conversely, if states with more insurers have better-functioning markets, then the implementation
of the ACA might also go more smoothly, leading to higher welfare.
In the last row of Figure 8, we compare states with an above-median number of insurers to
states with a below-median number of insurers, and we see that states with more insurers saw
23Not all insurers operating in a given state offer coverage statewide. Furthermore, we overstate the number of
insurers in some sense because “insurers” in our data can be carriers under the same parent company. However,
comparisons of the total number across states should still be informative.
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greater increases in coverage under the ACA. Differential patterns in premiums and average costs
are difficult to discern. Turning to the regression results in the top panel of Table 3, we see
that for each additional ten insurers in the market before the reform, state-level welfare from
the implementation of the ACA was lower by $5.20 per participant on a monthly basis and $62
(=5.2*12) on an annual basis. However, the coefficient is not statistically different from zero, and
its magnitude decreases by a third when we control for other state policies. Therefore, we see no
statistical relationship between the number of insurers in a state before the reform and the welfare
impact of the ACA.
7 Comparison to Existing Empirical Evidence on Selection
This paper contributes empirical evidence to a growing literature on the welfare impact of adverse
selection. Adverse selection is a key market failure from a theoretical perspective (Akerlof [1970];
Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976]), but there is little work on its magnitude from an empirical perspec-
tive. The early empirical literature focused on testing for the presence of adverse selection, but it
did not establish whether the welfare cost of selection was large or small (Chiappori and Salanie
[2000]; Finkelstein and Poterba [2006]). Accordingly, the large existing empirical literature on com-
munity rating and guaranteed issue regulations suggests they lead to adverse selection, but it does
not quantify the welfare cost (see, for example, Ericson and Starc [2012] and my own previous joint
work: Kowalski et al. [2008]).
The more recent empirical literature has established how to measure the welfare cost of adverse
selection (EFC; Einav et al. [2010b]; Bundorf et al. [2012]), and it provides empirical estimates.
However, it generally has focused on empirical contexts in which adverse selection is likely to have
a small welfare cost. These contexts focus on intensive margin (across insurance plan) selection for
individuals with access to employer-sponsored health insurance. However, there is reason to expect
that the extensive margin (insured vs. uninsured) selection among individuals without access to
employer-sponsored health insurance could be larger, if only because the individual mandate is
intended to address this type of selection.
Hackmann et al. [2012] and HKK examine extensive margin selection using variation induced
by the implementation of the Massachusetts health reform of 2006. The results show that the
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Massachusetts individual health insurance market was adversely selected before the reform and
that markups decreased after the reform. The total welfare gain in Massachusetts was large -
around 8.4% of insurer expenditures, or $442 per person annually - which is roughly twice as
large as the welfare cost of intensive-margin selection found by EFC. However, it is unclear if the
Massachusetts results will generalize to other states.
Using data from the first quarter of 2014, we see that most states experienced welfare gains
from decreases in adverse selection, as Massachusetts did. However, data through the first half of
2014 show advantageous selection in most states. Massachusetts experienced decreases in markups,
but data from the first quarter and first half of 2014 show markup increases in most states. We
cannot say conclusively if the Massachusetts experience will generalize to other states because the
data on coverage, premiums, and costs are still evolving. However, the current finding that higher-
cost individuals entered the pool in most states stands in stark contrast to the more established
finding that lower-cost individuals entered the Massachusetts pool after its reform. One potential
driver of the difference is that individuals who obtained subsidized coverage in Massachusetts had
to purchase it through the “CommCare” exchange, which was separate from the unsubsidized
exchange and excluded from the HKK analysis. In contrast, under national reform, individuals
who obtain subsidized coverage must obtain it through the same exchange that offers unsubsidized
coverage. If individuals who are eligible for subsidized coverage have higher costs than other
individuals, then they could drive the increases in average costs observed in most states in the first
half of 2014, but they would not have appeared in the Massachusetts pool. It will be informative to
investigate this potential mechanism by comparing the realized costs of people obtaining subsidized
vs. unsubsidized coverage as individual-level data become available.
For the purposes of this paper, we cannot use Massachusetts as a reliable control group for
other states. Massachusetts is different from other states in many ways, but the main reason why
we cannot use Massachusetts as a reliable control group here is that empirically, it experienced
anomalous decreases in enrollment after the ACA. These enrollment decreases were likely due to
substantial changes that Massachusetts made to its exchange. Even though there is no reliable
control state that did not experience the implementation of the ACA, by focusing on comparisons
between groups of states instead of comparisons within states, we can better control for national
trends and for changes in data reporting after the influx in coverage. Furthermore, we can examine
40
the welfare impact of some state policies as well as the impact of the ACA.
Several policies that potentially affect the individual health insurance market do not vary by
state, and this analysis holds them constant. For example, tax subsidies for employer-sponsored
health insurance could affect selection into the individual health insurance market. The availability
of bankruptcy as a backstop for medical bills in the absence of insurance could also affect selection
into the individual health insurance market (see Mahoney [2012]). However, in this paper, instead
of being totally agnostic about potential sources of adverse selection, the state-level comparisons
allow us to isolate the impact of some state-level policies.
8 Conclusion
I examine the impact of state policy decisions on the early effects of the ACA, focusing only on
the individual health insurance market. This is an important market to study because many of
the uninsured turn to this market for coverage. The overall impact of the ACA will depend on
impacts on several other markets, so findings that imply that individual health insurance market
participants in some states were “better off” or “worse off” do not capture the overall impact of the
ACA. Even in the states where I find that participants in the individual health insurance market
were “worse off,” the overall impact of the ACA could be positive.
Using a model developed by Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski (2013), I examine the impact of
the ACA on adverse selection and markups in the individual health insurance market state-by-state.
Estimates from my model imply that market participants in the five “direct enforcement” states
that ceded all enforcement of the ACA to the federal government are worse off by approximately
$245 per participant on an annualized basis, relative to participants in all other states. They
also imply that the impact of setting up a state exchange depends meaningfully on how well it
functions. Market participants in the six states that had severe exchange glitches are worse off by
approximately $750 per participant on an annualized basis, relative to participants in other states
with their own exchanges. My estimates provide suggestive evidence that participants in states that
allowed renewal of non-grandfathered plans are worse off than participants in other states. They
also provide inconclusive evidence that participants in states with pre-ACA community rating and
guaranteed issue regulations are better off than participants in other states. The estimates imply
41
further inconclusive evidence regarding the impact of having more insurers in the pre-ACA state
market.
This paper relies on data from the first half of 2014, and the national experience might evolve
over time. Given that the open season for coverage on the exchanges ended at the end of the first
quarter, enrollment is unlikely to change dramatically in the short term. However, it might be the
case that even though newly-insured individuals paid their premiums in the first half of 2014, they
will use their coverage with a lag, resulting in smaller markups as the year progresses. As long as
the cost lag does not vary along the same dimension as other state policies (and we have no reason
to expect that it will), what we have learned by comparing states with different policies should be
more robust than what we have learned nationally. The differential impact of state policies is likely
to be stable in the short term, at least until the next open season for coverage and likely until those
policies are changed.
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The underlying SNL data at the insurer-quarter level display several anomalies, such as missing,
negative, or extreme values for enrollment, coverage, premiums, and costs. My discussions with
SNL suggest that these anomalies persist because the NAIC does not have regulatory authority
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over the insurers that submit the filings. To address these anomalies, I perform several cleaning
techniques before allocating the data by state.
I begin the data cleaning process by first identifying the periods of time for which each firm is
active in the market. I define the active period as the period that begins when a firm first appears
with non-zero, positive enrollment, premiums, and costs and ends when the firm no longer appears
with non-zero, positive enrollment, premiums, and costs. This definition assumes that there are no
firms that enter the market, exit the market, and then re-enter the market at a later period.24 Once
I have identified the non-defunct periods of operation for firms, I drop the defunct insurer-quarter
observations from the sample.
One relatively common data anomaly appears to be that insurers file annual numbers in a single
end-of-year filing rather than in quarterly reports throughout the year.25 In the case of this data
anomaly, I allocate the values reported in the fourth quarter across the entire year, in proportion
to an estimated seasonally-adjusted trend for the given firm from the first quarter of 2008 through
the third quarter of 2013. (I do not include later data, which could be influenced by health reform).
I apply this treatment only to the larger firms that are capable of having a substantial impact
on the state-level analysis. Nevertheless, it should be clear that this method of imputation is a
clear improvement over using the raw data. Fortunately, this data anomaly does not seem to be
a major concern for the 2014 data. Throughout the period from Q1 2008 through Q4 2013, the
prevalence and severity of this data anomaly decrease substantially. In 2008–2010, this type of data
error affected firms accounting for nearly 6% of enrollment in terms of member months. By 2013,
however, the comparable figure drops to 0.2% of coverage. In addition, firms that appear in the
data during 2013 but not in 2014 (some of which may be legitimate examples of firm exit) account
for less than 1% of enrollment in terms of member months, suggesting that reporting is only rarely
an issue with respect to our 2014 data.
Finally, for each remaining firm, I identify and address remaining data anomalies using regres-
sion techniques at the firm level. For each firm, for each of the three variables of interest, I first
run a seasonally-adjusted trend regression from the first quarter of 2008 through the third quarter
24There are several cases for which a firm reports numbers for enrollment, premiums, and costs that are negligible
relative to other numbers in their active periods. In order to properly perform firm-level imputation, I exclude these
insurer-quarter observations from the non-defunct period and flag them for later imputation. Specifically, I flag such
observations as those for which the enrollment, premiums, or costs are less than one-tenth the median value.
25When this particular error occurs, the data reported by the firm in Q4 are roughly four times as large as the
data reported by the firm in quarters of other, non-anomalous years.
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of 2013. These seasonally-adjusted trend regressions exclude observations with a reported value
of 0. Using fitted values from these regressions, I identify outlier observations by predicting the
studentized residual for each observation and flagging those observations for which this statistic is
greater than 2. I then re-run each seasonally-adjusted trend regression, this time also excluding the
flagged outlier observations, and replace those observations, as well as observations with reported
values of zero (or less than zero), with the fitted value from the second-stage of estimation. I assess
the effect of my imputation procedure by comparing my imputed data to the raw data.26
All-in-all, though the data cleaning process requires many steps, it affects a very small number of
observations. For enrollment in terms of member months, 7.3% of observations, accounting for less
than 7% of aggregate member months, are imputed; for premiums, 8.6% of observations, accounting
for less than 7% of aggregate premiums are imputed; for costs, 10.0% of observations, accounting
for less than 8% of aggregate costs are imputed. Furthermore, for of the variables of interest—
enrollment, premiums, and costs—the coefficient of correlation between in the raw data and clean
data is in excess of 0.97. As I show in the Online Appendix, the state graphs constructed using
the imputed data are noticeably “cleaner” than those constructed using the raw data; however, our
corrections to these apparent outliers have no material impact upon our results and conclusions.
Therefore, we are confident that the imputations we have made are, at worst, benign and likely
present the analysis more transparently.
B Data Allocation by State
After cleaning the data at the insurer-quarter level, I allocate the data to the insurer-quarter-state
level. Allocation by state is trivial if the annual or Schedule T filings indicate a unique state. If
the filings do not indicate that the insurer operates in a unique state, I use the filings to inform
state allocation.
I first allocate the data by state according to the corresponding annual filing. For the 2014
quarters, I use the percentages from the 2013 annual filing, since the 2014 annual filing will not be
available until the end of the year. From the corresponding annual filing, I calculate the percentage
of aggregate enrollment in member months, total premiums collected, and total costs paid by state,
26For some firms, I have identified instances where analysis of firm-level time series patterns suggests that imputation
was unnecessary. In these cases, I have replaced the imputed data back with the raw data.
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and I apply that percentage to aggregate coverage, premiums, and costs by state, respectively, from
the quarterly filing. This allocation methodology ensures that the aggregate amounts of enrollment,
premiums, and total costs (when summed across all states) are preserved for each insurer-quarter
observation.
For insurer-quarter observations for which a corresponding annual filing is not available, I allo-
cate the data using supplemental Schedule T filings. The Schedule T filings are reported quarterly,
but they aggregate the individual health insurance line of business with other lines of business,
including “accident & health”, “life & annuity”, and “property/casualty.” Furthermore, they only
include premiums, and not enrollment or coverage, leading me to prefer the annual filings. My
allocation methodology using the Schedule T filings is as follows: I calculate the percentage of total
premiums attributable to each state for the insurer-quarter, and I apply those percentages to the
insurer-quarter data from the individual health insurance line of business.
C Table of Welfare Results by State
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  I*,post 	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Wfull/	  
I*,post
Wsel/	  I*,post 	  12π*
AK 125 147 8,727 107 117 3,824 90 94 3,067
AL -­‐61 -­‐100 7,015 -­‐60 -­‐80 9,221 -­‐59 -­‐72 10,468
AR -­‐18 -­‐145 644 -­‐28 -­‐86 633 -­‐38 -­‐83 628
AZ -­‐3 -­‐6 438 -­‐9 -­‐12 451 -­‐15 -­‐18 457
CA* -­‐119 -­‐147 479 -­‐60 -­‐122 586 -­‐1 -­‐82 663
CO -­‐9 -­‐17 108 -­‐12 -­‐19 89 -­‐15 -­‐21 81
CT 53 -­‐35 1,574 44 338 890 35 68 3,882
DC 21 150 492 10 13 2,313 -­‐2 -­‐15 1,291
DE 3 7 389 -­‐4 2 411 -­‐11 -­‐3 425
FL -­‐22 -­‐70 260 -­‐28 -­‐57 184 -­‐35 -­‐58 148
GA -­‐9 -­‐62 590 -­‐14 -­‐42 567 -­‐20 -­‐42 558
HI -­‐6 -­‐6 799 -­‐2 -­‐2 828 2 2 843
IA -­‐29 -­‐26 -­‐714 -­‐33 -­‐31 -­‐771 -­‐38 -­‐36 -­‐804
ID -­‐40 -­‐37 -­‐1,525 -­‐43 -­‐41 -­‐1,702 -­‐46 -­‐45 -­‐1,810
IL -­‐34 -­‐55 -­‐22 -­‐42 -­‐57 -­‐77 -­‐50 -­‐63 -­‐108
IN 13 -­‐179 1,031 1 -­‐55 1,181 -­‐11 -­‐58 1,224
KS -­‐41 -­‐39 -­‐241 -­‐50 -­‐48 -­‐270 -­‐59 -­‐58 -­‐287
KY 42 -­‐41 1,177 36 134 -­‐145 31 55 5,085
LA -­‐10 -­‐21 356 -­‐16 -­‐25 363 -­‐21 -­‐30 366
MA* -­‐23 -­‐20 1,067 -­‐11 -­‐3 1,132 0 11 1,162
MD 14 13 976 3 1 925 -­‐7 -­‐10 904
ME 139 -­‐12 2,339 126 -­‐17 2,159 113 41,581 1,887
MI 0 -­‐62 893 -­‐7 -­‐41 898 -­‐14 -­‐43 899
MN -­‐65 -­‐39 -­‐2,216 -­‐70 -­‐48 -­‐2,383 -­‐74 -­‐55 -­‐2,500
MO -­‐38 -­‐40 -­‐5,407 -­‐39 -­‐40 -­‐6,108 -­‐40 -­‐41 -­‐6,523
MS -­‐2 -­‐15 666 -­‐8 -­‐20 688 -­‐14 -­‐25 697
MT -­‐44 28 1,878 -­‐54 -­‐7,813 1,350 -­‐64 -­‐466 1,066
NC -­‐1 -­‐49 841 -­‐7 -­‐33 868 -­‐13 -­‐35 875
ND 2 2 1,084 1 0 1,066 -­‐1 -­‐2 1,059
NE -­‐24 -­‐23 -­‐1,536 -­‐26 -­‐26 -­‐1,664 -­‐28 -­‐28 -­‐1,736
NH 29 34 2,429 25 26 2,313 20 20 2,265
NJ* 149 754 441 135 309 157 122 209 -­‐121
NM -­‐53 -­‐364 -­‐561 -­‐55 -­‐134 -­‐2,385 -­‐57 -­‐104 -­‐3,224
NV 17 18 1,162 7 5 1,003 -­‐4 -­‐7 945
NY 104 -­‐67 2,472 97 -­‐91 1,658 91 574 493
OH -­‐55 -­‐63 -­‐8,781 -­‐56 -­‐61 -­‐10,451 -­‐57 -­‐61 -­‐11,472
OK -­‐38 -­‐64 -­‐73 -­‐46 -­‐64 -­‐153 -­‐53 -­‐69 -­‐199
OR -­‐66 -­‐52 -­‐1,467 -­‐71 -­‐60 -­‐1,645 -­‐76 -­‐67 -­‐1,765
PA -­‐40 -­‐53 -­‐716 -­‐45 -­‐54 -­‐859 -­‐50 -­‐58 -­‐939
RI 36 50 2,755 26 27 1,869 16 13 1,673
SC 6 -­‐18 937 -­‐2 -­‐23 993 -­‐10 -­‐30 1,013
SD -­‐34 -­‐30 -­‐2,094 -­‐36 -­‐33 -­‐2,278 -­‐39 -­‐36 -­‐2,389
TN -­‐22 -­‐29 -­‐308 -­‐26 -­‐32 -­‐365 -­‐30 -­‐36 -­‐394
TX -­‐31 -­‐85 38 -­‐37 -­‐69 -­‐98 -­‐43 -­‐68 -­‐163
UT -­‐27 -­‐37 6 -­‐35 -­‐43 -­‐17 -­‐42 -­‐50 -­‐30
VA 0 -­‐2 654 -­‐4 -­‐7 665 -­‐7 -­‐11 671
VT 16 20 2,484 13 14 2,167 10 10 2,056
WA -­‐52 -­‐58 2,553 -­‐48 -­‐51 2,925 -­‐44 -­‐45 3,141
WI 6 2 683 -­‐9 -­‐15 665 -­‐24 -­‐31 658
WV -­‐31 -­‐607 713 -­‐40 -­‐153 534 -­‐49 -­‐124 468
WY -­‐19 -­‐27 201 -­‐27 -­‐33 211 -­‐34 -­‐40 216
*States	  with	  data	  anomalies	  omitted	  from	  state-­‐level	  welfare	  regression	  analysis.	  	  MA	  is	  also	  omitted.
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